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We examine the relationship between equity risk and the use of financial derivatives with a 
sample of 555 banks from eighteen developed markets from 2006 to 2015. Our main findings 
suggest that banks’ use of financial derivatives increased their risk. This increase in risk can be 
driven by banks’ use of derivatives for speculative purposes, by suboptimal hedging to obtain 
hedge accounting status, or from accounting mismatches that generate volatility in earnings. 
We also show that this relationship is nonlinear. Too-Big-To-Fail banks and those that employ 
a traditional retail banking business model are subject to lower idiosyncratic risk. We address 
endogeneity concerns using instrumental variables capturing the use of derivatives with 
portfolio ranking. Overall, our study contributes to understanding the impact of derivatives use 
on bank risk and the risk consequences of a bank’s business model choice. 
 






















This study examines the impact of the use of financial derivatives on bank realized risk. 
The derivatives market has grown substantially over the past fifteen years, with the total 
notional amount of outstanding over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives having reached US$493 
trillion by the end of 2015—an increase of more than 424% over the year 2000 (Figure 1). 
Banks are the major player in the OTC market and have held a significant portion of these 
derivatives, acting as intermediaries in the interactions between nonbank participants, carrying 
out interbank trading as part of day-to-day business, and clearing positions created by making 
markets for their clients. The largest banks also provide OTC derivatives to both nonfinancial 
firms and other banks. In day-to-day business, these banks may take advantage of their market-
making roles to see the flows of OTC derivatives trading and carry out proprietary trading 
accordingly. In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests that some, if not all, banks use financial 
derivatives to bet on future changes in the prices of underlying securities.1 In the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis, regulators have expressed concerns about derivative exposures in 
banks’ balance sheets.2 
Derivatives are used by firms to hedge cash flow and earnings from unfavorable 
fluctuations in risk exposures, such as interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates, and 
commodity prices (Bartram et al., 2009). Prior literature generally supports that banks use 
derivatives to manage risk by complementing traditional lending activity (Brewer et al., 2001), 
to smooth earnings (Barton, 2001), or to manage equity risk directly and indirectly (Abdel-
Khalik & Chen, 2015). Studies that focus on the impact of derivative accounting standards on 
firm risk management identify that: (a) fair value reporting of derivatives makes their use more 
transparent and encourages prudent risk management (Melumad et al., 1999) and, (b) although 
speculative activities have been reduced (Zhang, 2009), sound hedging strategies have also 
been compromised (Lins et al., 2011). By reducing speculative activities, we expect a decrease 
                                               
1 For example, the trader known as the “London Whale” within JP Morgan Chase gambled heavily on an obscure corner of 
the credit default swap (CDS) market and lost $6.2 billion (Financial Conduct Authority, 2013). Banks have also been fined 
for manipulating benchmark rates—including LIBOR, FOREX, and Isdafix, which determine the payout of derivatives—to 
benefit their own trading positions (Financial Conduct Authority, 2016). 
2 The Basel Committee (2010, 2011) pointed out that one of the main reasons the financial crisis became so severe was that 
the banking sector of many countries had built up excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage. 
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in risk; however, given that sound hedging strategies are also compromised, the expectation is 
an increase in risk. Given this, whether the use of derivatives leads to more or less risk is unclear. 
We study the impact of the use of derivatives on bank risk by regressing the extent of 
derivatives usage (measured in fair value) on bank-level risk measures (i.e., total risk, 
systematic risk, and idiosyncratic risk). We find an overall positive relationship between the 
use of derivatives and bank risk. A potential explanation for this finding is that low 
informativeness of derivative accounting curtails the decision usefulness of financial reporting. 
The different incentives for using derivatives, the complex nature of derivative accounting 
(FASB, 2008), banks’ inability in applying accounting rules for derivatives correctly or 
consistently (Kawaller, 2004), and dispersed earnings forecasts due to analysts’ 
misinterpretation of the effect of derivatives (Chang et al., 2016) have collectively posed 
substantial challenges for investors in evaluating the risk inherent in derivative securities. 
We also show that the relationship between derivatives and bank risk is nonlinear. In 
particular, we show that in Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) banks and retail-oriented banks the use of 
derivatives lowers the level of idiosyncratic risk. Finally, we address potential endogeneity 
problems using instrumental variables capturing the use of derivatives with portfolio ranking 
and confirm that our results come from a causal relationship between banks’ use of derivatives 
and realized risk. 
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, our study complements 
prior literature, which is largely based on nonfinancial firms, on the effect of derivative 
accounting on firm risk management (Singh, 2004; Richie et al., 2006; Zhang, 2009; Glaum & 
Klöcker, 2011; Lins et al., 2011). Given banks’ extensive participation in derivative activities 
for trading and risk management purposes, our focus on the banking industry provides some 
additional interesting insights into this issue. Second, this study contributes to the literature on 
the risk consequences of a bank’s business model choice. Prior literature documents a number 
of benefits associated with a retail-oriented banking model.3 We add to this body of research 
by investigating the effect of the business model choice on the association between the use of 
                                               
3 For instance, Altunbas et al. (2011) find that a strong deposit ratio and greater income diversification improve bank resilience. 
Ayadi et al. (2013) document that retail-oriented banks are less likely to default. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) suggest 
that banking strategies that rely predominantly on attracting non-deposit funding or generating noninterest income are very 
risky. Mergaerts and Vander Vennet (2016) show that a strong reliance on retail banking activities is associated with higher 
profitability and stability. 
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derivatives and bank risk, and showing that retail-oriented banks are subject to lower risk than 
are investment-oriented banks. Third, our study is based on a sample of 555 banks listed in 
eighteen developed markets over the period 2006–2015, which compares favourably to prior 
studies (e.g., Choi & Elyasiani, 1997; Hirtle, 1997; Carter & Sinkey,1998; Li & Marinč, 2014; 
Mayordomo et al., 2014). We believe that this constitutes an important empirical contribution 
to the banking literature, as the results generated and conclusions drawn are likely to be more 
representative than are those that are derived from a smaller sample. In addition, the use of 
more recent data provides information about the current state of the banking sector. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we review the literature and 
develop the research hypotheses. Section 3 identifies the data sources, describes the sample 
selection process, defines the variables, and establishes the empirical methods. Section 4 reports 
the main results and robustness tests, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. Derivative Accounting and Risk Management 
A firm can hold derivatives to offset the inherent business risk (perfect hedge), to partially 
offset the inherent business risk (partial hedge), or to increase risk. Irrespective of the usage 
purpose, accounting rules for financial instruments follow a “mixed-attribute” model under 
which derivatives are reported as either assets or liabilities on the balance sheet at fair value, 
with unrealized gains/losses due to changes in fair value reported on the income statement 
(FASB, 1998). IAS 39 (Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement)4 and SFAS 133 
(Accounting for Derivatives Instruments and Hedging Activities) prescribed rules under which 
hedge accounting may be applied. Hedge accounting modifies the normal basis for recognizing 
gains/losses on a hedged item or hedging instrument. This treatment enables gains/losses on 
hedging instruments to be recognized in earnings in the same period as offsetting losses/gains 
on hedged items (Ramirez, 2015). This means income effects from both components of the 
hedge relationship (i.e., the hedging instrument and hedged item) affect earnings in a common 
                                               
4 While it was the regulation in place during the period under study, IAS 39 has been replaced by IFRS 9 since 1 January 2018. 
Key changes have been made to the following areas: classification and measurement of financial assets, classification and 
measurement of financial liabilities, impairment, and hedge accounting. See “IFRS 9: Financial Instruments – High Level 
Summary” (Deloitte, 2016) for a detailed discussion. 
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accounting period, thus minimizing income volatility (Kawaller, 2004). Unrealized gains/losses 
that result from transactions not qualifying for hedge accounting or that result from hedge 
infectiveness are recognized in earnings as they occur. Effective hedging can thus mitigate both 
earnings and cash flow volatility (Zhang, 2009). 
However, IAS 39 and SFAS 133 had the potential to increase the volatility of both earnings 
and return on shareholders’ equity (Lins et al., 2011). The extent to which volatility is affected 
depends on whether the derivatives position pass the effectiveness test to qualify for hedge 
accounting. To qualify for hedge accounting status, firms have to show that the derivative is 
designated to offset an underlying economic exposure, and that the hedge is highly effective 
(i.e., the exposure and the value of the hedging instrument are highly correlated). A hedge is 
deemed effective if the ratio of the change in derivative value to that of the hedged item falls 
within a range of 80%–125% over the life of the hedge (the 80/125 rule). This specific criterion 
leaves some scope for ineffectiveness. As Kalotay and Abreo (2001:94) observe, “an 
unintended and unfortunate consequence of the 80/125 rule is that during periods of market 
stability virtually any hedge is likely to fail, even though the resulting price movements are 
insignificant from a business perspective.” 
Let’s assume, for example, that a bank hedges $100 million loans with an interest rate swap 
(IRS). A $10,000 change in the value of the loans and a $5,000 opposite change in the value of 
the swap would result in the ratio 0.5, which violates the 80/125 rule and leads to an “ineffective 
hedge.” The bank is thus left with two basic choices: (1) obtaining hedge accounting status by 
increasing the use of the swap to at least $8,000 or (2) forgoing an economically effective 
hedging strategy rather than obtaining hedge accounting status (Lins et al., 2011), thus 
reflecting the impact of interest rate changes in reported earnings. Although the first choice 
allows the bank to obtain hedge accounting status, the bank is forced to take on additional risk 
as it uses more derivatives than it truly needs. The bank effectively pursues suboptimal hedging 
that is less efficient and prudent. The second choice would inflate the volatility of the bank’s 
earnings. 
In addition, the ratio 0.5 in the previous example is likely to be even lower if a bank holds 
a significant amount of non-term deposits that are fairly insensitive to changes in interest rate 
and thus serve as a type of hedge against the effect of interest rates changes on loans (Flannery 
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& James, 1984). When interest rates increase, the fair value of fixed-rate loans held by the bank 
will decrease. However, this loss will be offset by a rise in the fair value of the deposits due to 
the increasing benefits of low- or no-cost financing in an increasing interest rate environment. 
The bank will appear more volatile than it truly is if the hedge offered by deposits is not 
recognized but the fair value of loans is acknowledged (Blankespoor et al., 2013). 
An accounting mismatch may also be present when banks use credit default swaps (CDS) 
to hedge the credit risk arising from loans and loan commitments. Such a mismatch arises 
mainly because loans and loan commitments are normally not accounted for at fair value 
through profit or loss. The simplest accounting treatment would designate the credit risk as a 
risk component in a hedging relationship. However, as noted by the International Accounting 
Standards Board, it is difficult to isolate the credit risk as a separate risk to meet the eligibility 
criteria for risk components. The accounting mismatch would, in turn, create volatility in profit 
or loss (EY, 2014). 
To summarize, there are at least three potential channels through which banks increase 
their risks when using and reporting derivatives. First, banks can use derivatives for a 
speculative purpose rather than for hedging risks. Second, when banks use derivatives to 
manage risks (hedge) they can pursue suboptimal hedging to obtain hedge accounting status. 
Third, an accounting mismatch may arise from the difficulty in isolating the credit risk as a 
separate risk when banks use CDS to hedge the credit risk arising from loans and loan 
commitments, generating profit or loss volatility. 
Based on this discussion, we posit: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Banks that ex-ante hold a higher level of derivatives experience more risk ex-
post than do banks that ex-ante hold a lower level of derivatives. 
 
2.2. Financial Derivatives and Bank Risk
There are two primary sources of revenue for banks that participate in derivatives markets: 
one that comes from using derivatives as speculative vehicles, and the other that is generated 
when banks act as OTC dealers and charge fees to institutions that are placing derivative 
positions (Brewer et al., 2001). The former is considered one of the main motivations for using 
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financial derivatives, a view that is well established in the literature. Instefjord (2005) identifies 
two effects of credit derivatives innovation on the banking sector: they enhance risk sharing but 
also make additional acquisition of risk more attractive. A frequently asked question in this line 
of literature concerns whether firms use derivatives to hedge or to speculate. Most of these 
studies are based on nonfinancial firms. Chernenko and Faulkender (2011) consider hedging 
and speculation as the two sides of derivatives use, while Hentschel and Kothari (2001) provide 
detailed definitions that distinguish one from the other: “risk management that reduces [stock] 
return volatility is frequently termed hedging, and risk management that increases [stock] return 
volatility is called speculation.” According to O’Conner et al. (2011), hedging takes place when 
companies protect themselves against unexpected changes in rates that affect the returns they 
obtain from their underlying business, while speculation is associated with firms’ profit-seeking 
behavior by trading against a mispriced market. The two sets of definitions are similar, as both 
state that speculation takes place when the motive for using derivatives is associated with 
additional risk taking driven by profit seeking, not with hedging risk. The key assumption in 
these studies is that the motive behind the decision to use derivatives is to hedge risk rather than 
to speculate, but there are other reasons for using derivatives that may or may not reduce risk: 
reducing the expected cost of financial distress (Smith & Stulz, 1985), avoiding costly external 
financing by improving the match between internal cash flow and financing needs (Froot et al., 
1993), reducing the volatility of executive compensation (DeMarzo & Duffie, 1995), and 
speculating on movements in interest rates and earnings management (Bodnar et al., 1998; 
Faulkender, 2005; Geczy et al., 2007), among other reasons. 
With regard to the relationship between the use of derivatives and their impact on firm risk, 
Guay (1999) examines the impact of derivatives on firm risk among new users of derivatives 
and finds evidence that firm risk declines following the initial use of derivatives. Hentschel and 
Kothari (2001) study 425 large US corporations and find that, although many firms manage 
exposure with large positions in derivatives, their use does not necessarily reduce firm risk 
below that of firms that do not use them. Based on a sample of Australian firms, Nguyen and 
Faff (2010) show a nonlinear relationship between the use of derivatives and firm risk, finding 
that moderate users of derivatives reduce firm risk, while extensive users increase it. Based on 
a large sample of nonfinancial firms from forty-seven countries, Bartram et al.’s (2011) findings 
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suggest that the use of financial derivatives reduces both total risk and systematic risk and that 
derivative use was associated with significantly higher firm value, higher abnormal returns, and 
larger profits during the economic downturn in 2001-2002, when firms were hedging downside 
risk. 
In the context of the banking industry, Hirtle (1997) argues that derivatives have played a 
significant role in shaping US bank holding companies’ (BHCs) exposure to interest rate risk 
and that the positive association between the use of derivatives and exposure to interest rate 
risk is particularly strong for smaller banks, end-user banks, and BHCs that act as dealers. Choi 
and Elyasiani (1997) also establish a link between derivatives transactions and a bank’s overall 
risk exposure, which indicates that derivatives can be a source of increased solvency exposure. 
Venkatachalam (1996) contends that the average bank during the 1993-1994 period reduced its 
risk exposure by using derivatives, although more than half of the banks in Venkatachalam’s 
study appeared to use derivatives to assume additional risk rather than to reduce it. Minton et 
al. (2009) examine the extent to which US BHCs with assets in excess of US$1 billion used 
credit derivatives to hedge in the decade from 1995 to 2005, primarily for the purpose of dealer 
activities rather than for hedging credit exposure from loans. 
We predict that the relationship between banks’ use of derivatives ex-ante and realized 
idiosyncratic risk is nonlinear. Moderate use and aggressive use would lead to two opposite 
consequences: risk reduction and excessive risk taking, respectively. Therefore, we posit: 
 
Hypothesis 2. The relationship between banks’ use of derivatives ex-ante and realized 
idiosyncratic risk is nonlinear: moderate use reduces risk, while aggressive use results in 
excessive risk taking. 
 
2.3. Bank Financial Characteristics 
Some studies focus on the financial characteristics of banks that use (and do not use) 
financial derivatives. Carter and Sinkey (1998) find that a large community bank’s decision to 
use interest-rate derivatives is positively associated with its size. They also find a positive 
relationship between the use of IRS and capital position, which they interpret as the effect of 
regulatory and/or market discipline on banks’ obedience to capital adequacy requirements. 
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However, Sinkey and Carter’s (2000) later study of US commercial banks’ use of derivatives 
reveals no evidence of an association between banks’ capital positions and derivatives activities. 
They also find that banks that use derivatives have riskier capital structures, larger maturity 
mismatches between assets and liabilities, lower net interest margins, and more loan charge-
offs than those that do not use derivatives. The positive relationship between bank size and the 
use of derivatives is often interpreted as a cost-related motive for using derivatives or 
economies of scale–that is, that larger banks are more likely to make the investment in 
intellectual capital and control systems that is necessary to participate in derivatives activities 
(Carter & Sinkey, 1998; Sinkey & Carter, 2000). TBTF banks5 are perceived to have a higher 
propensity to assume excessive risk in order to profit in the short term, because they rely on an 
implicit government backstop. The existence of TBTF banks has often been criticized as one 
of the main factors in the distortion in banks’ risk-taking incentives (Boyd et al., 2009). The 
financial system is a system of promises, and derivatives allow TBTF banks to shift those 
promises around to arbitrage differences in risk weightings, regulatory differences, and taxes 
between sectors and jurisdictions. In the case of credit spreads, where TBTF banks are 
concerned, risk tends to be underpriced, resulting in lower credit spreads than would apply to 
separate derivative trading entities that do not have access to retail/commercial bank capital and 
official and unofficial guarantees and support (Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, 2011). Based on 
this discussion, we anticipate that the ex-post risk for TBTF banks is lower than that of non-
TBTF banks that also use derivatives, so we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3. TBTF banks’ use of derivatives leads to a lower level of idiosyncratic risk than 
does non-TBTF banks’ use of derivatives. 
 
The modern theory of financial intermediation explains how derivative contracting and 
lending can be complementary activities in banking. Diamond’s (1984) model shows that banks 
have monitoring advantages over small depositors, as banks can reduce their exposure to 
                                               
5 TBTF banks refer to the global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) identified by the Financial Stability Board (in 
consultation with Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and national authorities). G-SIBs are subject to higher capital 
buffer requirements, total loss-absorbing capacity requirements, resolvability requirements, and higher supervisory 
expectations (Financial Stability Board, 2016). 
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systematic risk by using derivatives to resolve mismatches in their assets’ and liabilities’ 
sensitivities to interest rates. Thus, interest-rate derivative activity can complement lending 
activity, but derivatives can also replace lending activities. A bank may alter its business model 
and move away from traditional lines of business in order to improve its financial performance. 
Brewer et al. (2000) document an increasing trend in FDIC-insured commercial banks’ use of 
derivatives, a trend that is accompanied by a downward trend in traditional lending activity, 
suggesting a substitution role for derivatives. Clark et al. (2007:40) observe, “At the bank level, 
the principal attraction of retail banking seems to be the relief that its revenues are stable and 
thus can offset volatility in the nonretail businesses. At the aggregate level, […] interest in retail 
banking fluctuates in rather predictable ways with the performance of nonretail banking and 
financial market activities.” 
Banks disclose relatively uniform and detailed information about their loan portfolios, such 
as loan charge-offs and nonperforming loans, which facilitates control of the intrinsic value of 
loans (Nissim, 2003). Retail-oriented banks are also better able to convert additional credit risk 
into a higher net interest margin, implying that retail banks can screen and monitor loans more 
effectively (Mergaerts & Vander Vennet, 2016). On the other hand, retail deposits represent a 
relatively stable source of long-term funding for banks. This is primarily because deposits are 
insured by the government in almost all developed economies6 and their withdrawals, in most 
cases, are motivated by individual depositors’ liquidity needs and thus predictable at the 
aggregate level (Huang & Ratnovski, 2011). The “sluggishness” of retail deposits also stems 
from the high switching costs associated with transaction services (e.g., information costs to 
discover a bank with more favorable rates; costs of learning different rates and conditions on 
the new deposits) that retail deposits receive from banks (Sharpe, 1997; Kim et al., 2003). 
Because non-term deposits (e.g., demand and savings deposits) are considerably insensitive to 
changes in interest rates, they also serve as a type of hedge against the impact of changes in the 
interest rate on loans (Flannery & James, 1984). 
Based on this discussion, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
                                               
6 The only exception is New Zealand. See Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2014) for a complete list of countries with explicit deposit 
insurance schemes as of the end of 2013. 
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Hypothesis 4. The use of derivatives by banks that employ a traditional retail banking business 
model leads to a lower level of idiosyncratic risk than it does for banks that employ a nonretail 
banking business model. 
 
3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
3.1. Data and Sample Selection 
To investigate the effects of derivatives use on bank risk, we collected data from Bankscope 
on the derivatives held at the end of each fiscal year during our sampling period (2006-2015) 
and other accounting data for banks from eighteen countries, and daily stock price data from 
Compustat from January 2006 to December 2015. We also retrieved stock indices for the 
financial sector from Thomson Reuter Datastream to calculate market return in each of the 
eighteen countries. 
Specifically, we employed the following risk measures: 
l Total risk (TR): The variance in daily stock returns in the fiscal year that derivatives were 
reported. 
l Systematic risk (SR): The product of the variance between the financial services sector’s 
daily market return and bank !’s market beta ("#) squared. "# is obtained from a market 
model as follows: 
$%& = "( + "#$#& + *%& 
$%&: Daily stock return of bank ! 
$#&: Daily return on the financial sector 
*%&: Error term 
l Idiosyncratic risk (IR): Variance in the residuals *%& from the market model above.
After merging the two datasets and dropping observations with missing data, we obtained a 
final sample of 555 banks and 3,313 bank-year observations. Tables 1 and 2 report the sample 
composition by country and by year, respectively. Although a substantial part of our sample 
comprises US banks, the number of non-US banks facilitates a balance between US and non-
US banks (i.e., 56.6 percent versus 43.4 percent). 
 
**Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here** 
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3.2. Empirical Design 
To determine the impact of the use of derivatives on bank risk, we estimate the following 
five models: 
+$%,& = -( + -./0+1%,&2. + -34560%,&2. + -78+9%,&2. + -:;01%,&2. + -<;=>%,&2. + -?>5@A5/%,&2.
+ -B+50$1%,&2. + -D;0+EF%,&2. + -G;58%,&2. + -.(5;EF%,&2. + -..E5$%,&2.
+ -.3$F11%,&2. + -.7H>H%,&2. + -.:/0=F45+%,&2. + -.</5I%,&2. + J0 + *%,&2. 
(1) 
4$%,& = "( + "./0+1%,&2. + "34560%,&2. + "78+9%,&2. + ":;01%,&2. + "<;=>%,&2. + "?>5@A5/%,&2.
+ "B+50$1%,&2. + "D;0+EF%,&2. + "G;58%,&2. + ".(5;EF%,&2. + "..E5$%,&2.
+ ".3$F11%,&2. + ".7H>H%,&2. + ".:/0=F45+%,&2. + ".</5I%,&2. + J0 + *%,&2. 
(2) 
5$%,& = K( + K./0+1%,&2. + K34560%,&2. + K78+9%,&2. + K:;01%,&2. + K<;=>%,&2. + K?>5@A5/%,&2.
+ KB+50$1%,&2. + KD;0+EF%,&2. + KG;58%,&2. + K.(5;EF%,&2. + K..E5$%,&2.
+ K.3$F11%,&2. + K.7H>H%,&2. + K.:/0=F45+%,&2. + K.</5I%,&2. + J0 + *%,&2. 
(3) 
5$%,& = L( + L.=$%,&2. + L3=$%,&2.
3
+ L74560%,&2. + L:8+9%,&2. + L<;01%,&2. + L?;=>%,&2. + LB>5@A5/%,&2.
+ LD+50$1%,&2. + LG;0+EF%,&2. + L.(;58%,&2. + L..5;EF%,&2. + L.3E5$%,&2.
+ L.7$F11%,&2. + L.:H>H%,&2. + L.</0=F45+%,&2. + L.?/5I%,&2. + J0 + *%,&2. 
(4) 
5$%,& = M( +NM	P
10
P=1
=F$+!,P + M..4560%,&2. + M.38+9%,&2. + M.7;01%,&2. + M.:;=>%,&2. + M.<>5@A5/%,&2.
+ M.?+50$1%,&2. + M.B;0+EF%,&2. + M.D;58%,&2. + M.G5;EF%,&2. + M3(E5$%,&2.
+ M3.$F11%,&2. + M33H>H%,&2. + M37/0=F45+%,&2. + M3:/5I%,&2. + *%,&2. 
 (5) 
Models 1, 2, and 3 are baseline models for our empirical analyses. Model 1 evaluates the 
impact of the extent of derivative use on banks’ TR, while Models 2 and 3 test the impact on 
SR and IR. In all three models, ex-post bank risk is modeled as a function of ex-ante derivatives 
use and other bank characteristics. DETA, which measures the extent of derivatives use, is the 
total fair value of a bank’s derivatives scaled by total assets. Nguyen and Faff (2010) document 
that it is not the use of derivatives but its extent that affects firm risk. The use of the total fair 
value of derivatives enables the total exposures to the derivatives’ counterparties to be 
accounted for, along with the counterparty risk (Venkatachalam, 1996). The coefficients of 
interest are	-.,	"., and K.. We expect that banks that used more derivatives ex-ante are subject 
to higher level of realized risk. Models 4 and 5 test for a nonlinear relationship between bank 
risk and derivatives use. In estimating Model 4, we segment the sample at each decile of DETA 
to create a portfolio ranking (PR). PR equals 0 for nonusers of derivatives and ranges from 1 to 
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10 according to the PR by decile. Model 5 uses portfolio dummy variables to examine the 
marginal effect of derivatives use on bank risk. We divide our sample into eleven portfolios 
and include them in the same regression. Portfolio 0 is the baseline portfolio that contains banks 
that do not use derivatives, and portfolios 1−10 are generated by partitioning the banks in the 
sample according to their extent of derivatives use (DETA) at each decile, such that Portfolio 
1 contains the lowest level of nonzero derivatives use in our sample and Portfolio 10 the highest. 
Thus, Model 5 is a fixed-effects model that benchmarks each portfolio’s bank risk against the 
baseline portfolio’s risk after taking the control variables into account. Thus, a negative 
coefficient on the portfolio dummy implies risk reduction, while a positive coefficient indicates 
an increase in the risk level over that of the baseline portfolio. The coefficient of interest is	M	P, 
and =F$+R is banks’ extent of derivatives use in each of the eleven portfolios. Therefore, a 
negative M	R indicates a risk-reducing effect of derivatives use in comparison to the baseline 
portfolio, while a positive M	R suggests a risk-inducing effect. 
We include a number of control variables that are relevant to explaining bank risk: We 
calculate SIZE by taking the natural logarithm of total assets, as extant studies suggest that 
larger firms are more likely to engage in risk-reducing behavior (Nance et al., 1993; Geczy et 
al., 1997). Larger size also implies greater systemic importance, so the contribution to system-
wide risk increases more than proportionately with relative size (Tarashev et al., 2010; 
Mayordomo et al., 2014). Market-to-book ratio (MTB) is a proxy for bank charter value7, which 
plays a disciplinary role. Demsetz et al. (1997) find a negative relationship between charter 
value and bank-risk taking, while Galloway et al. (1997) document that banks with low charter 
value take significantly more risk. Nonearning assets (NEA) are computed by dividing 
nonearning assets by total assets. Under both US GAAP and IFRS, items included in the 
category of nonearning assets, such as goodwill and other intangibles that have been determined 
to have indefinite lives, are subject to an impairment test at least once per annum. In practice, 
the impairment test may not necessarily capture the value of the impaired assets, as the 
quantification of impairment loss often relies on a discount rate that does not reflect current 
market assessments or the appropriate risk. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship 
                                               
7 The charter value can be derived from factors related to entry into the industry and/or access to protected markets. 
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between NEA and TR. Nonperforming loans (NPL) are calculated by scaling nonperforming 
loans by total assets. Banks with higher NPL are more likely to be financially distressed 
(Purnanandam, 2007), so we expect a positive relationship between NPL and TR. LIQUID, 
which measures liquidity, is calculated by scaling the sum of liquid assets, cash and due from 
banks, and other securities by total assets. Since more liquid banks are less likely to be 
financially distressed (Purnanandam, 2007), we expect a negative association between LIQUID 
and IR. Tier 1 capital ratio (TIER1) measures a bank’s capital position. Since banks with 
stronger capital positions are less likely to face financial distress (Minton et al., 2009), we 
expect a negative relationship between TIER1 and IR. NETCO, a proxy for exposure to credit 
risk, is calculated by dividing net loan charge-offs by total assets. We anticipate a positive 
association between NETCO and IR. Net interest margin (NIM) is calculated by dividing net 
interest income by total assets. INCO (interest coverage) is calculated as earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total interest expense to provide a prederivative measure 
of exposure to interest rate risk. Cost-to-income ratio (CIR) is calculated by dividing operating 
expenses by the sum of net interest revenue and other operating income. We include this 
variable to control for differences in technical efficiency across banks (Boyd et al., 2006). 
Return on average assets (ROAA) is a profit measure. It is calculated by scaling net income by 
yearly averaged total assets. GLG refers to yearly growth rate of gross loan, while DEPO 
measures the extent to which a bank operates on a retail banking business model, calculated by 
dividing total deposits by total assets. DIV is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the bank paid 
dividends during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. If a bank paid a dividend, it is less likely 
to be capital-constrained, as it could cut its dividends to strengthen its capital position. All 
variables in the final sample are winsorized at 1% in both tails to account for extreme 




4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 provides summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. Of the 
555 banks in eighteen countries in our sample, 387 banks are derivatives users. The average 
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total assets of all banks in our sample is US$150 billion, but the total assets of banks that use 
derivatives are US$215 billion. Banks that use derivatives tend to be larger primarily because 
large banks are usually more willing to invest in the training required to use derivatives, as the 
fixed costs associated with training can be spread among the opportunities offered by using a 
large number of derivatives (Brewer et al., 2001). Our sample includes G14 banks–the fourteen 
most active derivative dealer banks–the average total assets of which are US$1.92 trillion 
during the sample period. The mean interest coverage ratio of our sample is 2.97, suggesting 
that these banks can easily make the interest payments on outstanding debt with their EBIT. 
The mean Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio is 13.08 percent, suggesting that the banks in our 
sample are overall well capitalized. For ease of presentation, TR, SR and IR are multiplied by 
100. 
Table 4 reports the correlation for each of the variables. Univariate analysis shows a 
significant and negative correlation between TR and SIZE, TR and LIQUID, and TR and TIER1, 
as well as a significant and positive correlation between TR and NEA, TR and NPL, and TR 
and NETCO, providing preliminary support for our anticipated relationship between TR and 
these three control variables. The significant correlation between SIZE and DETA is consistent 
with the view that economies of scale and/or scope are present in banks’ derivatives activities: 
the barriers to entry are high and include high setup costs for large global businesses and the 
need for sophisticated trading platforms with rapid execution times in the derivatives business 
(Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, 2011). The significant and negative association between DETA 
and TIER1 provides preliminary support for the view that banks with less capital have greater 
incentive to manage capital by using derivatives. This finding contrasts Carter and Sinkey’s 
(1998) finding of a positive relationship between the amount of capital and the use of 
derivatives and Sinkey and Carter’s (2000) finding of no relationship. The significant and 
negative relationship between DETA and DEPOSIT indicates that banks that employ a business 
model that relies more on deposit taking are less engaged in derivatives activities. 
 




4.2. Baseline Model Regression Results 
Our baseline models (Models 1, 2, and 3) estimate whether the use of derivatives causes 
banks to undertake higher levels of risk. Hypothesis 1 pertains to a positive relationship between 
the use of derivatives ex-ante and ex-post bank risk. We test this hypothesis 1 by running the 
OLS estimation of bank risks (i.e., TR, SR, IR) at time t as a function of the level of derivatives 
at time t-1, controlling for other variables. We cluster standard errors at the bank- and year-
level to account for within-bank and within-year correlation of the error terms, so standard 
errors computed are robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and a correlated panel. The 
results, reported in Table 5, support Hypothesis 1: The coefficient of DETA is positive and 
statistically significant (columns 1 and 3); that is, bank risk is an increasing function of the 
extent of derivatives use, the extent of derivatives use is associated with an increase in banks’ 
idiosyncratic risk, and there is no evidence for a link between derivative use and systematic risk. 
This last point is consistent with the conventional view that idiosyncratic risk is more relevant 
than systematic risk is in explaining the variation in an individual stock’s risk over time. We 
also find that larger banks are better at mitigating risk (TR and IR), while they pose greater 
systematic risk (SR). Banks with higher charter value take less risk, confirming the disciplinary 
role of charter value in bank risk taking. Banks with more NEA are subject to higher TR and 
IR, indicating the substantial risk associated with evaluating and managing nonearning assets. 
LIQUID has a negative correlation with TR, but it is not statistically significant in the baseline 
results. The results for other control variables, such as NPL, TIER1, NETCO and DIV, are 
significant and consistent with our predictions. We also perform additional tests that decompose 
DETA at Levels I, II, and III8, obtaining overall consistent results, as reported in Table 6. While 
all three of these measures are significantly and positively associated with IR, Level III 
derivatives result in the highest IR, a finding that is in line with the difficulties and uncertainty 
associated with fair value measurement of unobservable inputs at Level III. In unreported tests, 
we use derivatives with positive fair value and negative fair value separately and obtain results 
                                               
8  Level I inputs are quoted prices in active markets for identical assets or liabilities that the entity can access on the 
measurement date [IFRS 13:76]. Level II inputs are inputs other than the quoted market prices included in Level I that are 
observable for the asset or liability, either directly or indirectly [IFRS 13:81]. Level III inputs are unobservable inputs for the 
asset or liability [IFRS 13:86]. 
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that are consistent with estimations that use the total fair value of derivatives to estimate 
baseline models. 
 
**Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here** 
 
4.3. A Nonlinear Relationship
We estimate Models 4 and 5 to test Hypothesis 2, which proposes that the relationship 
between banks’ idiosyncratic risk and the use of derivatives ex-ante is nonlinear. We use OLS 
regression with robust standard errors computed as described in Section 4.2. The results, shown 
in Table 7, support Hypothesis 2. The coefficient of PR	is negative and statistically significant, 
while the coefficient of PR3 is positive and significant, so moderate use of derivatives reduced 
banks’ idiosyncratic risk while aggressive use of derivatives led to excessive risk compared to 
that of nonusers. This finding of nonlinearity is consistent with Nguyen and Faff’s (2010) 
finding. However, the story changes in regard to the banking industry. As our results show, a 
substantial number of banks assume additional risk by using derivatives, while other banks 
reduce risk. We believe that this difference is driven primarily by the differences between banks’ 
and nonfinancial firms’ business models. To ascertain the marginal impact of derivatives use 
on bank risk, we estimate Model 5, which employs portfolio dummy variables, as described in 
Section 3.2. Table 8 reports the relationship between the extent of derivatives use and the three 
risk measures, which relationship is in line with the results of Model 4. While the results in 
columns 1 and 3 are similar, we focus on the results in column 3 for purposes of brevity. Overall, 
in comparison to the baseline portfolio (Portfolio 0), banks in Portfolios 3, 4, 6, and 7 reduced 
their risk, banks in Portfolios 1, 9, and 10 increased their risk, and the risk level of Portfolios 2, 
5, and 8 does not differ statistically significantly. IR appears to be a decreasing function of the 
extent of derivatives use up to the level of average derivatives held by banks in Portfolio 4 (0.2 
percent), so the optimal level of derivatives held in the current sample is 0.2 percent, a level at 
which IR is minimized. Bank risk starts to increase when a bank’s use of derivatives exceeds 3 
percent, corresponding with the upper bound of banks’ level of derivatives use in Portfolio 7. 
In Portfolios 8, 9, and 10—large banks with average total assets of US$0.17 trillion, US$0.55 
trillion, and US$1.22 trillion, respectively—there is a tendency for the increase in bank risk to 
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be an increasing function of the level of derivatives use. Together with the significant and 
negative coefficient of SIZE, this result reaffirms that larger banks have more expertise in risk 
management than smaller banks do. Banks in Portfolio 1 do not appear to be effective in 
achieving risk reduction through derivatives use, so the extent of derivatives use in Portfolio 1 
can be seen as a threshold for using derivatives for the purpose of reducing risk. Moreover, the 
average size of the banks in Portfolio 1 is the lowest among the ten portfolios, which suggests 
that scale is an important barrier to entry into derivatives activities. It is also possible that the 
banks in Portfolio 1 are new derivatives users that do not have a well-developed system with 
which to hedge and apply hedge accounting effectively. However, banks in the four risk-
reducing portfolios are smaller than those in risk-inducing portfolios, which, in conjunction 
with the greater reduction in risk achieved in these portfolios, provides support for the 
conventional view that smaller banks benefit the most from hedging with derivatives since the 
costs of bankruptcy are greater for these firms (Warner, 1977). 
 
**Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here** 
 
4.4. Too-Big-To-Fail Banks 
The test for Hypothesis 3 examines the moderating effect of a bank’s TBTF status in the 
association between a bank’s use of derivatives and ex-post idiosyncratic risk. We estimate 
Models 1, 2, and 3 with an additional dummy variable, TBTF, and its interaction with DETA 
(+9+J × /0+1). TBTF equals 1 if a bank is identified as a globally systemically important 
bank in the Basel Committee’s GSIB assessment, and 0 otherwise. All other control variables 
are the same as defined in Section 3.2. The results, shown in Table 9, support Hypothesis 3. 
The coefficient on DETA remains positive and statistically significant, and the coefficient on 
the interaction term is negative and significant, which means that ceteris paribus, TBTF banks 
are subject to lower idiosyncratic risk than non-TBTF banks are. 
 




4.5. Bank Business Model
Similar to the test for Hypothesis 3, we test Hypothesis 4 based on the estimations of 
Models 1, 2, and 3, with an additional dummy variable, traditional retail banking (TRB) and its 
interaction with DETA (+$9 × /0+1). TRB takes a value of 1 if a bank’s deposits and loans 
exceed the sample’s median9, and 0 otherwise. Banks whose TRB equals 1 focus more on 
traditional banking activities and less on derivatives markets. All other control variables are the 
same as defined in Section 3.2. Table 10 reports the results for this estimation, which support 
Hypothesis 4. The coefficient on DETA is positive and statistically significant, while the 
interaction term is negative and significant, suggesting that banks that employ a traditional retail 
banking business model that focuses on deposit taking and loan making are subject to lower 
idiosyncratic risk than are banks that operate an investment-banking-oriented business model. 
 
**Insert Table 10 about here** 
 
4.6. Robustness Tests 
4.6.1. Endogeneity
The main empirical challenge that is critical to our study’s design is a potential endogeneity 
problem induced by the reverse causality between the use of derivatives and bank risk; that is, 
a bank’s risk level might affect its decision to use derivatives. Consequently, a simple 
regression of bank risk on derivatives use would likely to generate a biased coefficient on 
DETA. This methodological concern is aggravated by the difficulties in finding an ideal 
exogenous instrument that is correlated with DETA but uncorrelated with the error term in our 
baseline model specification. To control for the potentially endogenous use of derivatives in 
estimating the relationship between derivatives use and bank risk, we perform instrumental 
variables (IV) regression analyses, which are equivalent to two-stage least squares regression. 
Considering the nonlinear relationship between bank risk and derivatives use as discussed in 
Section 4.3, we use PR by decile and its quadratic form, =$3, as the instruments10 in the two-
                                               
9 Both loans and deposits are scaled by bank total assets. The sample medians are 0.820 and 0.649 for deposits-to-total-assets 
and loans-to-total-assets, respectively. 
10 We also perform Durbin-Wu-Hausman (Durbin, 1954; Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978) test to compare the IV and OLS estimates. 
We reject the null hypothesis that both the IV and the OLS estimates are consistent at the 5% level, suggesting that OLS 
estimates are biased and that IV should be considered. 
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stage least squares regression. Identification of the IV model requires a strong correlation 
between the instruments and DETA. We perform the Kleibergen-Papp Rank LM test to 
determine whether the equation is identified such that it indicates whether the excluded 
instruments are correlated with the endogenous predictor, DETA. We reject the null hypothesis 
for this underidentification test, so the two instruments are relevant and the model is identified. 
We also perform a weak instrument test as proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005); if the F-statistic 
from the first-stage regression exceeds the critical value (using 10% bias), the instrument is 
deemed to be valid. The critical value is 19.93, which is less than the F-statistic, so we conclude 
that the instruments are not weak. In addition, the Hansen (1982) J test for overidentifying 
restrictions indicates that the null hypothesis of valid instruments is not rejected. (The p-values 
for the J-statistic of Models 1 and 3 are 0.687 and 0.147, respectively.) Overall, the results from 
these additional tests, reported in Table 11, are consistent with the results of the baseline model 
estimation, so we conclude that the potential endogeneity problem does not bias our results. 
 
**Insert Table 11 about here** 
 
The potential feedback effects between some facets of banking activity and the size and 
intensity of derivatives use also deserves a comment. For example, the use of derivatives may 
reduce banks’ incentive to monitor their loan portfolios (Morrison, 2005). We share this 
concern with studies in this line of research (e.g., Mayordomo et al., 2014) and acknowledge 
that the use of derivatives can affect some bank activity, so tests of reverse causality among 
control variables are necessary to address this issue. However, neither our sample size nor 
frequency (yearly) is ideal for tests of reverse causality among explanatory variables, which is 
unlikely to generate results of high statistical power. We are also confined by the nontrivial 
identification of suitable instruments for each of these explanatory variables. Notwithstanding 
that this potential feedback is still a controversial problem, we refrain from performing these 
tests while acknowledging that the feedback effects between bank characteristics that are rooted 
in various aspects of banking activity should be monitored and addressed in future research, 
when the nature of the sample allows it to be. 
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4.6.2. Individual Effects of Different Types of Derivatives
 We acknowledge that the impact on bank risk of the type of derivatives (e.g., interest rate 
derivatives, credit derivatives, foreign exchange derivatives, commodity derivatives, and equity 
derivatives) may differ, so tests of individual effect of these derivatives may be important. 
However, we refrain from performing these tests for three reasons. First, this type of data is 
readily available only for US banks, while for non-US banks considerable effort is required to 
either hand-collect the data or to combine multiple databases that are not compatible in the 
format of reporting. Second, we attempted to perform these tests based on a subsample 
consisting of available data on US banks11 and found that the pairwise correlation between 
each of these five types of derivatives ranges from 73.4 percent to 96.8 percent, which makes 
disentangling the effect by type of derivatives difficult. Third, previous studies document a 
negative impact of interest rate derivatives on bank equity risk (Carter & Sinkey, 1998) and a 
positive impact of credit derivatives on bank equity risk (Minton et al., 2009). Future studies 
may look into the individual effects of different types of derivatives through more 
comprehensive and formal empirical tests, which should also be contingent upon data 
availability across countries. 
 
4.6.3. Exclusions
We perform additional analyses to check on the robustness of baseline models’ estimations. 
We first base our estimation on the sample that contains only banks that used derivatives during 
our sample period (2,001 observations) and obtain similar results (Table 12), although the effect 
of DETA on TR is not significant in this case. The main implication of these results is that 
banks that hold higher levels of derivatives assume additional risk, and this effect is still present 
in the sample that comprises only user banks. We also base our estimation for Models 4 and 5 
on this user-only sample and obtain consistent results. Then we exclude the G14 banks—as, in 
addition to derivatives trading, they also undertake market-making and underwriting 
activities—and obtain results similar to baseline model results. We also exclude the financial 
crisis period (2007–2009) to rule out the excessive volatility in stock returns the crisis caused, 
which reduces the number of observations to 2,617 but leads to consistent results. 
                                               
11 Combining the accounting data from Bankscope, stock data from CRSP, and data on holdings of the five types of derivatives 
obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank, we obtain a sample of 293 US banks (1,875 observations). 
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**Insert Table 12 about here** 
 
4.6.4. Out-of-sample Model Prediction
If a bank’s use of derivatives increases its idiosyncratic risk, then a predictive model based 
on all of the control variables except DETA used in Model 3 should under-predict the 
idiosyncratic risk of banks that use derivatives. We divide the sample according to banks’ 
participation in derivatives and estimate predicted idiosyncratic risk for two subsamples. The 
user sample comprises banks that used derivatives in the sample period (2,456 observations), 
and the nonuser sample comprises banks that did not use derivatives in the sample period (1,509 
observations). We estimated Model 6 for the nonuser sample. 
 
5$%,& = V( + V.4560%,&2. + V38+9%,&2. + V7;01%,&2. + V:;=>%,&2. + V<>5@A5/%,&2. + V?+50$1%,&2.
+ VB;0+EF%,&2. + VD;58%,&2. + VG5;EF%,&2. + V.(E5$%,&2. + V..$F11%,&2. + V.3H>H%,&2.
+ V.7/0=F45+%,&2. + V.:/5I%,&2. + J0 + * 
(6) 
The coefficients estimated from the nonuser sample are applied to the sample of user variables 
to calibrate predicted IR for banks in the user sample. The average predicted IR for the user 
sample is 0.031, and the average actual IR is 0.035. A paired comparison test for the difference 
between these averages gives a t-statistic of -4.198, which indicates a statistically significant 




We provide evidence on the relationship between the use of derivatives and bank risk. We 
find an overall positive relationship between banks’ ex-ante use of derivatives and ex-post risk, 
suggesting that banks generally increase risk by using derivatives. In particular, we find that 
this relationship is nonlinear: moderate use of financial derivatives reduces risk, whereas 
aggressive use increases it. We also document that TBTF banks’ use of derivatives lowers the 
level of idiosyncratic risk more than it does for non-TBTF banks and, for banks that operate a 
traditional retail banking business model, the use of derivatives lowers the level of idiosyncratic 
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risk. Overall, our study contributes to understanding the impact of derivatives use on bank risk, 
and the risk consequences of a bank’s business model choice. 
This study has some limitations that are shared with previous studies mainly pertaining to 
data availability. First, the use of archival data (e.g., Singh, 2004; Richie et al., 2006; Zhang 
2009) does not allow direct observation or measurement of firms’ hedging behavior (Glaum & 
Klöcker, 2011; Lins et al., 2011). Second, because the use of derivatives is bonded with the 
financial reporting of derivatives, it is difficult to determine whether the effects on banks’ risk 
are driven by the use or reporting of derivatives. Third, this study shows only the effect of 
derivative use on bank risk but not the potential return generated. Ultimately, banks are in the 
business of taking risk—without risk, they cannot generate required returns for shareholders. 
An interesting topic for future research can be whether the risk arising from using derivatives 
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Figure 1. Global OTC Derivatives 2000-2015 (USD billion) 
 
















Table 1. Sample Composition by Country 
Country Frequency Percentage 
AUT 54 1.63 
BEL 12 0.36 
CAN 20 0.60 
CHE 103 3.11 
DU 78 2.35 
DNK 170 5.13 
ESP 60 1.81 
FIN 11 0.33 
FRA 69 2.08 
GBR 81 2.44 
GRC 50 1.51 
ITA 159 4.80 
JPN 342 10.32 
NLD 18 0.54 
NOR 145 4.38 
PRT 29 0.88 
SWE 37 1.12 
USA 1,875 56.60 
Total 3,313 100.00 
 
Table 2. Sample Composition by Year 
Year Frequency Percentage 
2006 171 5.16 
2007 213 6.43 
2008 221 6.67 
2009 262 7.91 
2010 286 8.63 
2011 421 12.71 
2012 452 13.64 
2013 406 12.25 
2014 436 13.16 
2015 445 13.43 








Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 







TR* 3313 0.064  0.079  0.021  0.033  0.070  
SR* 3313 0.020  0.036  0.001  0.007  0.020  
IR* 3313 0.043  0.063  0.012  0.021  0.043  
DETA 3313 0.035  0.094  0.000  0.001  0.015  
SIZE 3313 16.134  2.300  14.129  15.710  17.674  
MTB 3313 6.910  19.281  0.720  1.128  1.914  
NEA 3313 0.078  0.050  0.049  0.068  0.095  
NPL 3313 0.013  0.013  0.006  0.009  0.014  
LIQUID 3313 0.358  0.198  0.229  0.313  0.425  
TIER1 3313 0.131  0.044  0.105  0.125  0.148  
NETCO 3313 0.003  0.006  0.000  0.001  0.004  
NIM 3313 0.026  0.011  0.015  0.028  0.033  
INCO 3313 2.969  3.569  1.330  1.936  3.653  
CIR 3313 0.665  0.153  0.573  0.651  0.732  
ROAA 3313 0.006  0.010  0.003  0.007  0.010  
GLG 3313 0.071  0.158  -0.006  0.044  0.109  
DEPOSIT 3313 0.773  0.138  0.718  0.820  0.865  
DIV 3313 0.738  0.440  0.000  1.000  1.000  
*For ease of presentation, TR, SR and IR are multiplied by 100. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 4. Correlation Between Variables
  TR SR IR DETA SIZE MTB NEA NPL LIQUID TIER1 NETCO NIM INCO CIR ROAA GLG DEPOSIT 
SR 0.610*** 1                               
IR 0.878*** 0.156*** 1                             
DETA 0.047** 0.258*** -0.094*** 1                           
SIZE -0.064*** 0.388*** -0.310*** 0.588*** 1                         
MTB -0.103*** -0.01 -0.121*** -0.066*** 0.212*** 1                       
NEA 0.092*** 0.150*** 0.025 0.093*** 0.137*** 0.081*** 1                     
NPL 0.340*** 0.262*** 0.269*** -0.053** -0.015 -0.133*** 0.102*** 1                   
LIQUID -0.083*** 0.042* -0.127*** 0.354*** 0.319*** 0.214*** 0.353*** -0.124*** 1                 
TIER1 -0.164*** -0.120*** -0.133*** -0.043* -0.192*** 0.008 0.211*** -0.081*** 0.342*** 1               
NETCO 0.503*** 0.182*** 0.516*** -0.056** -0.167*** -0.135*** 0.163*** 0.369*** -0.098*** 0 1             
NIM 0.112*** -0.107*** 0.201*** -0.368*** -0.607*** -0.357*** 0 0.143*** -0.428*** 0.047** 0.347*** 1           
INCO -0.306*** -0.164*** -0.282*** -0.112*** -0.008 0.167*** 0.134*** -0.250*** 0.199*** 0.199*** -0.244*** 0.003 1         
CIR 0.340*** 0.025 0.409*** 0.036* -0.173*** -0.048** 0.091*** 0.025 0.079*** -0.047** 0.187*** -0.006 -0.172*** 1       
ROAA -0.531*** -0.281*** -0.494*** -0.081*** -0.073*** -0.040* 0.049** -0.367*** 0.031 0.220*** -0.405*** 0.156*** 0.414*** -0.499*** 1     
GLG -0.207*** -0.086*** -0.208*** -0.007 -0.008 -0.027 0.025 -0.201*** -0.007 -0.021 -0.243*** 0.049** 0.159*** -0.132*** 0.267*** 1   
DEPOSIT 0.018 -0.179*** 0.127*** -0.510*** -0.484*** 0.146*** -0.089*** -0.019 -0.265*** -0.050** 0.118*** 0.395*** 0.164*** 0.111*** -0.032 -0.003 1 
DIV -0.229*** -0.065*** -0.249*** -0.037* 0.036* 0.103*** -0.023 -0.356*** -0.052** -0.022 -0.178*** 0.028 0.196*** -0.171*** 0.231*** 0.140*** 0.112*** 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 5. Impact of Derivatives Use on Bank Risk – Baseline Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 !"# $"# %"# 
&'()*+, 0.030** -0.002 0.034*** 
 [2.380] [-0.254] [4.318] 
-./'*+, -0.003*** 0.008*** -0.011*** 
 [-2.999] [17.495] [-15.558] 
0(1*+, -0.000* 0.000 -0.000** 
 [-1.813] [0.114] [-2.374] 
2')*+, 0.115*** 0.044*** 0.068*** 
 [5.120] [3.949] [3.981] 
234*+, 0.981*** 0.367*** 0.594*** 
 [5.318] [3.589] [4.640] 
4.56.&*+, -0.001 0.001 -0.002 
 [-0.181] [0.349] [-0.441] 
(.'71*+, -0.114*** 0.037*** -0.153*** 
 [-3.462] [3.018] [-5.193] 
2'(9:*+, 1.182*** -0.327** 1.511*** 
 [3.315] [-2.370] [4.581] 
2.0*+, -0.269 0.170* -0.444*** 
 [-1.446] [1.949] [-2.651] 
.29:*+, 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 
 [3.877] [1.146] [4.153] 
9.7*+, 0.016 -0.011* 0.028*** 
 [1.493] [-1.781] [3.046] 
7:))*+, -2.317*** -0.611*** -1.670*** 
 [-9.976] [-3.976] [-8.482] 
;4;*+, -0.010* 0.000 -0.010** 
 [-1.655] [0.114] [-2.462] 
&'3:-.(*+, -0.024** -0.001 -0.024*** 
 [-2.498] [-0.246] [-3.162] 
&.<*+, -0.011*** -0.001 -0.010*** 
 [-5.009] [-0.954] [-5.044] 
Constant 0.112*** -0.113*** 0.233*** 
 [5.027] [-10.064] [12.207] 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 3,313 3,313 3,313 
R-squared 0.573 0.523 0.517 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 [Robust t-statistics in brackets]  




Table 6. Impact of Derivatives Use on Bank Risk – Level I, II & III
 (1) (2) (3) 
 !"# $"# %"# 
4'<'4.*+, 0.000 -0.001*** 0.001*** 
 [0.286] [-7.044] [2.829] 
4'<'4..*+, 0.001 -0.005** 0.007* 
 [0.283] [-2.097] [1.773] 
4'<'4...*+, 0.023*** 0.003 0.019*** 
 [2.927] [1.056] [2.793] 
-./'*+, -0.002** 0.008*** -0.010*** 
 [-2.469] [18.896] [-15.584] 
0(1*+, -0.000* 0.000 -0.000** 
 [-1.885] [0.221] [-2.517] 
2')*+, 0.111*** 0.042*** 0.066*** 
 [4.978] [3.769] [3.884] 
234*+, 0.943*** 0.368*** 0.555*** 
 [5.075] [3.610] [4.254] 
4.56.&*+, 0.001 0.003 -0.002 
 [0.103] [0.953] [-0.444] 
(.'71*+, -0.117*** 0.037*** -0.156*** 
 [-3.549] [3.011] [-5.308] 
2'(9:*+, 1.156*** -0.327** 1.485*** 
 [3.228] [-2.363] [4.492] 
2.0*+, -0.302 0.156* -0.464*** 
 [-1.629] [1.782] [-2.774] 
.29:*+, 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 
 [3.897] [0.967] [4.211] 
9.7*+, 0.017 -0.011* 0.029*** 
 [1.632] [-1.746] [3.223] 
7:))*+, -2.340*** -0.609*** -1.696*** 
 [-10.065] [-3.966] [-8.557] 
;4;*+, -0.010* 0.000 -0.011*** 
 [-1.752] [0.141] [-2.600] 
&'3:-.(*+, -0.029*** -0.002 -0.029*** 
 [-3.039] [-0.325] [-3.805] 
&.<*+, -0.011*** -0.001 -0.010*** 
 [-4.940] [-0.895] [-5.007] 
Constant 0.110*** -0.115*** 0.231*** 
 [4.927] [-10.313] [12.132] 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 3,313 3,313 3,313 
R-squared 0.574 0.524 0.518 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 [Robust t-statistics in brackets]  
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 7. Impact of Derivatives Use on Bank Risk – Portfolio Ranking Results 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  !"#   $"#   %"#  
&'()*  0.0002 [0.443] 
 
 0.0009*** [3.964] 
 
 -0.0008** [-2.310] 
 &'+()*  0.0002* [1.958] 
 
 -0.0002*** [-3.238] 
 
 0.0005*** [5.438] 
 ,-./()*  -0.0012 [-1.498] 
 
 0.0077*** [18.409] 
 
 -0.0094*** [-13.972] 
 012()*  -0.0004*** [-5.299] 
 
 -0.0001*** [-4.255] 
 
 -0.0002*** [-4.507] 
 3/4()*  0.1415*** [6.127] 
 
 0.0543*** [4.557] 
 
 0.0828*** [4.972] 
 3&5()*  0.7238*** [3.784] 
 
 0.4723*** 0.0047*** 
 
 0.2366** [2.254] 
 5-67-8()*  -0.0138** [-2.101] 
 
 -0.0033 [-0.968] 
 
 -0.0103** [-2.047] 
 1-/'1()*  -0.0719** [-2.135] 
 
 0.0536*** [3.684] 
 
 -0.1297*** [-4.611] 
 3/1:;()*  1.4889*** [4.166] 
 
 -0.3376** [-1.962] 
 
 1.8172*** [5.864] 
 3-0()*  0.2962* [1.888] 
 
 0.4921*** [5.637] 
 
 -0.2260* [-1.774] 
 -3:;()*  0.0015*** [3.890] 
 
 0.0003** [2.074] 
 
 0.0011*** [4.036] 
 :-'()*  0.0265** [2.336] 
 
 -0.0082 [-1.103] 
 
 0.0353*** [4.003] 
 ';44()*  -2.4457*** [-8.939] 
 
 -0.7125*** [-3.504] 
 
 -1.6906*** [-8.538] 
 <5<()*  -0.0050 [-0.833] 
 
 0.0050 [1.494] 
 
 -0.0104** [-2.508] 
 8/&;,-1()*  0.0086 [0.833] 
 
 0.0184*** [2.942] 
 
 -0.0120* [-1.783] 
 8-=()*  -0.0079*** [-3.442] 
 
 -0.0008 [-0.671] 
 
 -0.0072*** [-3.662] 
 Constant  0.0347* [1.706] 
 
 -0.1424*** [-13.029] 
 
 0.1860*** [11.720] 
 Country FE  YES -  YES -  YES 
Year FE  YES -  YES -  YES 
Observations  3,313 -  3,313 -  3,313 
R-squared  0.534 -  0.422 -  0.508 





Table 8. Impact of Derivatives Use on Bank Risk – Portfolio Analysis Results 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  !"#   $"#   %"#  
&;'11()*  0.025*** [3.909] 
 
 0.011*** [4.775] 
 
 0.013** [2.501] 
 &;'12()*  0.007 [1.300] 
 
 0.008*** [3.532] 
 
 -0.001 [-0.234] 
 &;'13()*  -0.009* [-1.861] 
 
 -0.001 [-0.466] 
 
 -0.008** [-1.977] 
 &;'14()*  -0.009* [-1.700] 
 
 0.002 [1.026] 
 
 -0.011*** [-2.914] 
 &;'15()*  0.005 [0.822] 
 
 0.006** [2.249] 
 
 -0.002 [-0.585] 
 &;'16()*  -0.003 [-0.517] 
 
 0.004 [1.100] 
 
 -0.007** [-2.449] 
 &;'17()*  0.000 [0.005] 
 
 0.005 [1.579] 
 
 -0.006* [-1.816] 
 &;'18()*  0.011* [1.721] 
 
 0.010** [2.446] 
 
 0.001 [0.183] 
 &;'19()*  0.010* [1.694] 
 
 0.004 [0.912] 
 
 0.007** [2.215] 
 &;'110()*  0.015** [2.349] 
 
 0.003 [0.685] 
 
 0.013*** [3.721] 
 ,-./()*  -0.003*** [-3.413] 
 
 0.007*** [14.202] 
 
 -0.011*** [-15.238] 
 012()*  -0.000 [-0.115] 
 
 -0.000 [-0.003] 
 
 -0.000 [-0.139] 
 3/4()*  0.184*** [5.901] 
 
 0.071*** [4.697] 
 
 0.107*** [5.351] 
 3&5()*  0.321 [1.601] 
 
 0.302** [2.570] 
 
 0.016 [0.150] 
 5-67-8()*  -0.003 [-0.425] 
 
 0.000 [0.017] 
 
 -0.003 [-0.648] 
 1-/'1()*  -0.330*** [-9.247] 
 
 -0.042*** [-2.905] 
 
 -0.284*** [-9.917] 
 3/1:;()*  1.327*** [3.488] 
 
 -0.311* [-1.712] 
 
 1.639*** [5.205] 
 3-0()*  0.815*** [3.987] 
 
 0.667*** [6.322] 
 
 0.099 [0.673] 
 -3:;()*  -0.002*** [-3.809] 
 
 -0.001*** [-4.347] 
 
 -0.001*** [-2.847] 
 :-'()*  0.037*** [2.849] 
 
 -0.006 [-0.818] 
 
 0.044*** [4.587] 
 ';44()*  -2.238*** [-7.350] 
 
 -0.604*** [-2.919] 
 
 -1.601*** [-7.674] 
 <5<()*  0.013 [1.618] 
 
 0.012*** [2.959] 
 
 0.000 [0.005] 
 8/&;,-1()*  -0.047*** [-3.849] 
 
 -0.002 [-0.296] 
 
 -0.045*** [-5.796] 
 8-=()*  -0.001 [-0.465] 
 
 0.001 [0.708] 
 
 -0.002 [-1.075] 
 Constant  0.144*** [5.893] 
 
 -0.106*** [-8.789] 
 
 0.257*** [14.209] 
 Observations  3,313 -  3,313 -  3,313 
R-squared  0.277 -  0.254 -  0.356 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 [Robust t-statistics in brackets]; Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 9. Impact of Derivatives Use on Bank Risk – TBTF vs. Non-TBTF 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  !"#   $"#   %"#  
8/14()*  0.033** [2.167]  -0.007 [-0.562]  0.040*** [4.431] 
121G()*  0.014* [1.912]  0.000 [0.055]  0.014*** [2.633] 
121G()* × 8/14()*  -0.027 [-1.028]  0.010 [0.492]  -0.038** [-2.329] 
,-./()*  -0.003*** [-3.161]  0.008*** [17.156]  -0.011*** [-15.479] 
012()*  -0.000* [-1.793]  0.000 [0.114]  -0.000** [-2.350] 
3/4()*  0.116*** [5.175]  0.044*** [3.962]  0.069*** [4.056] 
3&5()*  0.986*** [5.342]  0.370*** [3.603]  0.597*** [4.661] 
5-67-8()*  -0.003 [-0.451]  0.001 [0.473]  -0.004 [-0.840] 
1-/'1()*  -0.111*** [-3.367]  0.036*** [2.998]  -0.150*** [-5.080] 
3/1:;()*  1.184*** [3.319]  -0.326** [-2.359]  1.512*** [4.582] 
3-0()*  -0.291 [-1.549]  0.167* [1.902]  -0.464*** [-2.742] 
-3:;()*  0.001*** [3.980]  0.000 [1.075]  0.001*** [4.299] 
:-'()*  0.016 [1.493]  -0.011* [-1.779]  0.028*** [3.046] 
';44()*  -2.315*** [-9.955]  -0.609*** [-3.949]  -1.671*** [-8.467] 
<5<()*  -0.010 [-1.639]  0.001 [0.157]  -0.010** [-2.474] 
8/&;,-1()*  -0.024** [-2.442]  -0.001 [-0.205]  -0.023*** [-3.106] 
8-=()*  -0.011*** [-4.941]  -0.001 [-0.968]  -0.010*** [-4.966] 
Constant  0.115*** [5.116]  -0.114*** [-10.072]  0.236*** [12.245] 
          
8/14()*+121G()* × 8/14()*  0.005 [0.230]  0.004 [0.210]  0.002 [0.160] 
          
Country FE  YES -  YES -  YES - 
Year FE  YES -  YES -  YES - 
Observations  3,313 -  3,313 -  3,313 - 
R-squared  0.574 -  0.523 -  0.517 - 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 [Robust t-statistics in brackets]; Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 10. Impact of Derivatives Use on Bank Risk – Traditional Retail Banking 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  !"#   $"#   %"#  
8/14()*  0.028** [2.195]  -0.001 [-0.075]  0.030*** [3.775] 
1'2()*  0.003 [1.174]  -0.002** [-1.973]  0.006** [2.162] 
1'2()* × 8/14()*  0.239 [0.629]  0.939*** [3.531]  -0.759*** [-2.733] 
,-./()*  -0.002*** [-2.857]  0.007*** [16.963]  -0.010*** [-14.693] 
012()*  -0.000* [-1.885]  0.000 [0.029]  -0.000** [-2.412] 
3/4()*  0.115*** [5.135]  0.045*** [4.076]  0.067*** [3.908] 
3&5()*  0.974*** [5.271]  0.345*** [3.408]  0.611*** [4.750] 
5-67-8()*  0.001 [0.188]  0.002 [0.475]  -0.000 [-0.067] 
1-/'1()*  -0.111*** [-3.315]  0.030** [2.481]  -0.143*** [-4.749] 
3/1:;()*  1.174*** [3.282]  -0.313** [-2.336]  1.488*** [4.536] 
3-0()*  -0.277 [-1.494]  0.168** [1.974]  -0.451*** [-2.708] 
-3:;()*  0.001*** [3.817]  0.000 [1.162]  0.001*** [4.025] 
:-'()*  0.016 [1.512]  -0.011* [-1.756]  0.028*** [3.050] 
';44()*  -2.304*** [-9.850]  -0.581*** [-3.882]  -1.691*** [-8.711] 
<5<()*  -0.010* [-1.750]  0.000 [0.132]  -0.011*** [-2.608] 
8/&;,-1()*  -0.028*** [-2.818]  -0.003 [-0.636]  -0.025*** [-3.312] 
8-=()*  -0.011*** [-4.914]  -0.001 [-1.178]  -0.010*** [-4.841] 
Constant  0.112*** [4.994]  -0.107*** [-9.541]  0.225*** [11.727] 
          
8/14()*+1'2()* × 8/14()*  0.267 [0.700]  0.938*** [3.520]  -0.729*** [-2.620] 
          
Country FE  YES -  YES -  YES - 
Year FE  YES -  YES -  YES - 
Observations  3,313 -  3,313 -  3,313 - 
R-squared  0.574 -  0.529 -  0.518 - 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 [Robust t-statistics in brackets]; Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 11. Robustness – Endogeneity (IV Approach) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 !"# $"# %"# 
&'()*+, 0.094*** 0.027* 0.067*** 
 [3.850] [1.877] [3.856] 
-./'*+, -0.004*** 0.007*** -0.011*** 
 [-4.223] [16.118] [-15.395] 
0(1*+, -0.000** 0.000 -0.000*** 
 [-2.305] [0.441] [-3.352] 
2')*+, 0.134*** 0.044*** 0.087*** 
 [5.893] [3.969] [5.155] 
234*+, 0.772*** 0.417*** 0.333** 
 [3.825] [3.906] [2.297] 
4.56.&*+, 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.001*** 
 [3.820] [-3.008] [5.212] 
(.'71*+, -0.001 -0.002 0.002 
 [-0.080] [-0.694] [0.332] 
2'(9:*+, -0.093*** 0.034*** -0.129*** 
 [-3.239] [2.886] [-5.337] 
2.0*+, 1.189*** -0.306** 1.496*** 
 [3.553] [-2.258] [4.929] 
.29:*+, -0.050 0.151* -0.205 
 [-0.276] [1.716] [-1.295] 
9.7*+, 0.001*** 0.000* 0.001*** 
 [4.345] [1.715] [4.481] 
7:))*+, 0.008 -0.012* 0.021** 
 [0.742] [-1.919] [2.331] 
;4;*+, -2.231*** -0.628*** -1.567*** 
 [-9.952] [-4.123] [-8.479] 
&'3:-.(*+, -0.008 0.000 -0.008** 
 [-1.403] [0.016] [-2.090] 
&.<*+, -0.013 0.002 -0.016** 
 [-1.281] [0.387] [-2.019] 
Constant 0.112*** -0.102*** 0.221*** 
 [5.035] [-9.197] [11.753] 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 3,313 3,313 3,313 
R-squared 0.584 0.522 0.545 
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.687 0.001 0.147 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 [Robust z-statistics in brackets] 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 12. Robustness – User Banks Only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 !"# $"# %"# 
&'()*+, 0.021 -0.007 0.030*** 
 [1.600] [-0.745] [3.870] 
-./'*+, -0.000 0.008*** -0.008*** 
 [-0.381] [14.255] [-12.355] 
0(1*+, -0.000 0.000 -0.000** 
 [-0.770] [1.397] [-2.181] 
2')*+, 0.078*** 0.043*** 0.030* 
 [2.928] [3.109] [1.664] 
234*+, 1.194*** 0.495*** 0.672*** 
 [5.325] [3.423] [5.666] 
4.56.&*+, -0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 [-0.041] [0.229] [-0.256] 
(.'71*+, -0.003 0.067*** -0.076*** 
 [-0.081] [3.897] [-3.016] 
2'(9:*+, 0.634* -0.596*** 1.240*** 
 [1.647] [-3.136] [3.819] 
2.0*+, -0.039 0.063 -0.095 
 [-0.201] [0.551] [-0.655] 
.29:*+, 0.001* 0.000 0.001** 
 [1.756] [0.135] [2.389] 
9.7*+, 0.004 -0.017** 0.023** 
 [0.257] [-1.979] [1.990] 
7:))*+, -2.490*** -0.890*** -1.546*** 
 [-8.777] [-4.376] [-6.690] 
;4;*+, -0.006 0.001 -0.007* 
 [-0.910] [0.189] [-1.741] 
&'3:-.(*+, -0.013 0.006 -0.020*** 
 [-1.159] [0.882] [-2.633] 
&.<*+, -0.010*** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
 [-3.797] [-2.886] [-2.763] 
Constant 0.058** -0.117*** 0.182*** 
 [2.274] [-7.719] [9.101] 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 2,001 2,001 2,001 
R-squared 0.644 0.589 0.553 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 [Robust t-statistics in brackets] 




Appendix 1. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
TR (Total risk) The variance in daily stock returns in the fiscal year that derivatives were 
reported 
SR (Systematic risk) The product of the variance between the financial services sector’s daily 
market return and individual bank’s market beta squared 
IR (Idiosyncratic risk) Variance in the residuals =>*  obtained from the market model: 
7>* = @A + @C7C* + =>*  
7>*: Daily stock return of bank D 
7C*: Daily return on the financial sector 
=>*: Error term 
DETA (Extent of derivatives use) Total fair value of a bank’s derivatives divided by total assets 
LEVELI The sum of the fair value of Level 1 trading assets and liabilities divided by 
total assets 
LEVELII The sum of the fair value of Level 2 trading assets and liabilities divided by 
total assets 
LEVELIII The sum of the fair value of Level 3 trading assets and liabilities divided by 
total assets 
SIZE (Bank size) Natural logarithm of total assets 
MTB (Market-to-book) Market value of common equity divided by book value of common equity 
NEA (Nonearning assets) Nonearning assets divided by total assets 
NPL (Nonperforming loans) Nonperforming loans divided by total assets 
LIQUID (Liquidity) The sum of liquid assets, cash and due from banks, and other securities 
divided by total assets 
TIER1 (Tier 1 capital ratio) Tier 1 regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets 
NETCO (Net charge-offs) Net loan charge-offs divided by total assets 
NIM (Net interest margin) Net interest income divided by total assets 
INCO (Interest coverage) EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) divided by total interest expense 
CIR (Cost-to-income ratio) Operating expenses divided by the sum of net interest revenue and other 
operating income 
ROAA (Return on average assets) Net income divided by yearly averaged total assets 
GLG (Gross loan growth) The yearly growth rate of gross loans 
DEPOSIT (Deposits) Total deposits divided by total assets 
DIV (Dividend dummy) Dummy=1 if a bank paid dividend during the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise 
TBTF (Too-Big-To-Fail) Dummy=1 if a bank is identified as a global systemically important bank in 
the Basel Committee’s G-SIB assessment 
TRB (Traditional Retail Banking) Dummy=1 if a bank’s levels of deposits and loans exceed the median of the 
sample 
 
